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Abstract—Deep Neural Network has proved its potential in
various perception tasks and hence become an appealing option
for interpretation and data processing in security sensitive
systems. However, security-sensitive systems demand not only
high perception performance, but also design robustness under
various circumstances. Unlike prior works that study network
robustness from software level, we investigate from hardware
perspective about the impact of Single Event Upset (SEU)
induced parameter perturbation (SIPP) on neural networks. We
systematically define the fault models of SEU and then provide
the definition of sensitivity to SIPP as the robustness measure
for the network. We are then able to analytically explore the
weakness of a network and summarize the key findings for the
impact of SIPP on different types of bits in a floating point
parameter, layer-wise robustness within the same network and
impact of network depth. Based on those findings, we propose
two remedy solutions to protect DNNs from SIPPs, which can
mitigate accuracy degradation from 28% to 0.27% for ResNet
with merely 0.24-bit SRAM area overhead per parameter.
Index Terms—component, formatting, style, styling, insert
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (abbrev. DNNs) have recently at-
tracted enormous attention due to the success in various
perception tasks [1], [2] and it is an appealing idea to adopt
DNNs in security sensitive systems for in-depth inference and
efficient data processing, such as autonomous automobile and
medical monitoring. On the other hand, the robustness of DNN
itself is of great concern for such security related applications
and hence has been widely studied. Various methods, including
adversarial example [3] and fault injection [4], are devised to
attack DNNs. Their aim is to fool the networks to generate
adversarial outputs.
Other than such carefully generated perturbations, adding
small but random noise to DNNs may also induce severe
damage. Stevenson et. al. and Cheney et. al. [5], [6] analyze
the impact of random numerical noise to the weights of DNNs
and observe significant degradation in classification accuracy
when certain layers are ”polluted”. Although such noises are
numerically small, they are not necessarily insignificant when
implemented in hardware.
Thus, Donato et al., Reagen et al. and Sha et al. [7]–[9]
investigate the robustness of DNNs from emerging device,
architecture and system perspective. However, they treated all
error conditions homogeneously and sampled only a small
portion of the errors to analyze the average effects. In security
Fig. 1. Classification accuracy for different neural networks (NIN, VGG16
and ResNet56) under different types of SEU-induced perturbation. Blue: the
accuracy for the original network; Orange: the minimum accuracy with per-
turbation on one weight’s sign bit across all the weights; Gray: the minimum
accuracy for perturbation on one exponent bit across all the exponent bits of
the weights.
sensitive applications, the focus is more on the worst case
instead of average performances. [10] Thus, in this work,
we conduct more thorough experiments to explore the worst
case. To reduce the complexity of our searches, we place
our focus on the minimum perturbation that can occur in
a digital system, i.e., single bit flip. Single bit flip can be
triggered by Single Event Upset (abbrev. SEU) in daily lives
with ionizing particles hitting storage devices and logic units
[11]. In reliability analysis, SEUs are often manifested as ”bit
flips” in which the value of a single bit is reversed from ”0”
to ”1” or vice versa [12]. Fig. 1 demonstrates the impact
of SEU induced parameter perturbation on different network
architectures including Network in Networks (NIN) [13],
VGG16 [14] and Residual Neural Networks (ResNet) [15].
The figure compares the case without perturbation and the
cases with perturbations occurring at sign bit or exponent bit.
The accuracy of ResNet56 (trained on CIFAR-100 [16]) drops
to almost 1% for bit flip on the exponent. The figure simply
presents that the smallest perturbation in DNN parameters
may cause serious damage. Since SEUs are not uncommon in
our everyday lives, the aforementioned perturbation is actually
detrimental to the security-sensitive systems [6].
Thus, in this paper, we thoroughly investigate the problem of
SEU-Induced Parameter Perturbation (abbrev. SIPP) for DNNs
as well as its remedy solutions. To the best of our knowledge,
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this is the first work that studies the worst case of SIPP for
DNNs. The contributions of the work include:
• We formally define the fault models to study SEU in-
duced perturbation and propose an experimental flow to
measure the network robustness sensitivity to SIPP. Sev-
eral key observations are then summarized for ResNet56
with the proposed flow.
• We analytically explore the impact of SIPP on parameters
and the propagation of SIPP to the network output
(Section 4.1 and 4.2). The analysis provides us in-depth
understanding of how SIPP affects the system and pro-
vides us guidelines to investigate the weakness of other
DNNs.
• We then thoroughly investigate the robustness of three
representative DNNs, NIN, VGG16 and ResNet56 (Sec-
tion 4.3). After the investigation, three key findings which
confirm our observations are presented.
• Based on the findings, we propose two simple yet effi-
cient remedy solutions, triple modular redundancy (TMR)
and error-correction code (ECC) to ensure complete
protection from SIPP (Section 5). Design trade-off is
then explored between protection overhead and design
robustness for the two methods.
Experimental results show that without any protection, SIPP
on a Sign bit for ResNet56 may easily induce more than
28% accuracy degradation. ECC based protection scheme can
reduce such degradation to 0.27% with SRAM overhead of
merely 0.24 additional bit per parameter on average.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Single Event Upset
SEU is a transient information destruction on memory or
logic elements caused by an energetic ionizing radiation. Ion-
ized radiation particles may generate electron-hole pairs when
they penetrate into the silicon substrate of a transistor [12].
After electron-hole pairs are generated, their transportation,
such as diffusion and drift, collects electric charge to the drain
region of the transistor. In memory elements, the collected
charge accumulates and finally induces a glitch in the affected
transistor, upsetting the stored information. In terrestrial envi-
ronment, SEU is generally induced by two kinds of particles,
alpha particles emitted from package material and neutrons
originating from cosmic ray. In security sensitive applications,
package material with low alpha particle emission is used to
mitigate alpha particle induced SEU. However, since abundant
neutrons in the cosmic ray go through materials on the ground
and consequently they are difficult to eliminate with shielding,
SEU threatens terrestrial VLSIs and hence demands targeted
protections.
B. Deep Neural Networks
A typical feed forward DNN is a collection of convolu-
tion, activation, normalization, pooling and fully connected
(abbrev. FC) layers. The network is specified by a set of
parameters, including weights, biases means and variances.
Since means and variances can be written in the form of
weights and biases, for simplicity, parameters specified in
this paper just refer to weights and biases.
A convolution layer applies 2D convolutions over an input
signal composed of several input planes, i.e., feature maps.
The output is then a 3D tensor with a similar shape. In the
simplest case, the output value of the convolution layer with
Cin input channels and Cout output channels can be precisely
described as:
O(q) = b(q) +
Cin−1∑
p=0
K(q, p)⊗ I(p), q = 1, . . . , Cout (1)
in which I(·) and O(·) denote the input and output planes, ⊗
is the convolution operation. K is a set of 2D convolution
kernels, with each corresponding to one pair of input and
output planes. b is a set of scalars globally added to each
2D output plane. The operation of FC layers can also be
represented by Eq. (1) using scalars instead of 2D planes. The
activation and pooling layers are normally hard-wired without
extra parameters. The normalization layers normalizes each
channel’s output with trained means and variances.
C. IEEE Standard for Floating Point Arithmetic in Hardware
Implementation
According to IEEE standard [17], 32-bit FP numbers com-
monly used in DNNs can be represented by:
x = (−1)Sign × (1 + Fraction)Exponent−Bias (2)
in which Sign is the sign bit. Exponent is an unsigned
integer for exponent that uses the second to the ninth bits. In
a 32-bit FP number, Bias is 127. Fraction is a fixed point
number represented by the rest of the bits with the highest bit
representing 2−1.
III. OBSERVATIONS
A. Single Event Upset in Neural Networks
Hirokawa et al. [11] show that, when exposed to terrestrial
neutrons, a bit in SRAM has a probability of 1.33× 10−24 to
flip in 1 ns. For all the parameters in one Neural Network, as-
suming that the flip of each bit is independent, the probability
of at least one bit flip is:
Pflip = 1− ((1− Psingle)N∗W )T/t
=
n−1∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(−1)n−i+1Pn−isingle, n = N ×W × T/t
≈ N ×W × T/t× Psingle
(3)
in which N is the number of trained parameters, W is the data
width of each parameter, T is device life time, t is the test
time interval, i.e., 1 ns as above, and Psingle is the probability
for one bit flip within t. The approximation in Eq. (3) is
appropriate when N ×W ×T/t << 1/Psingle, which usually
holds for DNNs [11]. For a typical DNN with more than 10M
parameters, in one month, the probability of having at least
one bit flip would be as high as 10%, which is hazardous
for the aforementioned security-sensitive scenarios and hence
demands in-depth understanding of the impact of SEU induced
perturbation.
B. Fault Model
It is crucial to select an appropriate fault model to measure
the impact of SEU-induced failures to DNNs. In our exper-
iments, for simplicity, we rely on the following assumptions
for our fault model:
1) The training and inference processes are fault-free, and
the fault is only introduced by hardware failures in stor-
age devices, which preserves the network’s parameters.
2) Among all the parameters, only one bit of one parameter
is with fault and the others are fault-free.
C. SSIPP: Measuring Neural Network Robustness
To analyze the effect of SIPP, it is crucial to have a
rigorously-defined metric to measure the impact of SIPP on
DNNs. Apparently the most straightforward way is to compare
the output difference for the same set of inputs. Thus, here we
propose the concept of Sensitivity to SIPP (abbrev. SSIPP) as
a quantitative measure to assess the differences of network
robustness. The definition of SSIPP is as below:
Definition: For SIPP on a particular bit i, its performance
change due to the perturbation from the original network can
be calculated by ∆Pi = Poriginal − PSIPPi , where P (·)
denotes the performance measure for a network.1 Then the
robustness measure of SSIPP is defined as:
SSIPP = max
∀ i
∆Pi (4)
Unlike similar performance degradation based methods [7],
[8] have been proposed, SSIPP focus on searching all possible
fault patterns (flipping all the bits of a network) and finding the
worst case. If the perturbed bits are limited to one particular
layer, then it measures SSIPP of this particular layer for the
network. The one with a smaller SSIPP is considered more
robust.
Fig. 2. Flow to measure SSIPP for a DNN.
The work flow to measure SSIPP is illustrated in Fig. 2.
First, the original network is tested on the validation set to
obtain the reference performance Poriginal. Then, we induce
SIPP on one bit of the network to obtain a perturbed net-
work, which is also tested on the same validation set to
measure its performance PSIPP . After that we can compute
the performance change ∆Pi due to this particular bit. Finally,
by visiting every bit of the network, we obtain the network
robustness measure SSIPP .
1Performance measure is specific to the network type and application, e.g.,
cross-entropy for segmentation, accuracy for classification.
D. Observations
With the given definition of SSIPP and flow in Fig. 2, we
conduct a preliminary experiment to understand the impact of
different SIPP patterns. We use ResNet-56 as the underlying
DNN. The perturbation is introduced to the MSBs of a FP
number,i.e. sign bit, the highest exponent bit and the highest
fraction bit of the parameters, respectively. After checking all
the parameters in the network, Table I summarizes SSIPP for
different layers of ResNet-56. From the table, there are a few
key observations that can be made for the impact of SIPP on
ResNet56:
• Observation 1: the highest exponent bit consistently has
the highest SSIPP across different layers while the impact
of SIPP on a fraction bit is very limited.
• Observation 2: the first layer, which directly deals with
the input stream, has higher SSIPP than the other layers,
then follow the lasted layers. This indicates higher robust-
ness for the hidden layers in the middle of a network.
Then a natural question for the observations is:“Are those
observations universal or unique to ResNet56?” This motivates
us to conduct more in-depth explorations to understand the
DNN robustness to SIPP, which will be discussed in the next
section.
TABLE I
SSIPP FOR DIFFERENT LAYERS IN RESNET56: INPUT, RESIDUAL (STACK
1, 2 AND 3) AND FC.
SSIPP Input Stack 1 Stack 2 Stack 3 FC
Sign 28.09% 6.43% 2.08% 0.27% 0.90%
Ex1 70.19% 70.19% 70.19% 70.19% 70.19%
Frac1 0.43% 0.29% 0.41% 0.25% 0.30%
IV. EXPLORATIONS
In this section, we conduct systematical analysis of the
impact of SIPP on parameter value in a DNN and how SIPP
propagates to the output. The analysis then provides theoretical
explanations to the observations in the last section.
A. Understanding the Impact of SIPP on Parameters
As is discussed in Sect. III, there are different types of
bits in a 32-bit FP parameter, including Sign, Exponent
and Fraction bits. Thus, SIPP on different bits may impose
different impacts on the parameter value. For a pre-trained
DNN with known parameters, we can analyze the relative
error ∆rel imposed by SIPP. SIPP on Sign bit will cause
the parameter to take its opposite value, i.e., ∆rel = 2. For
SIPP on Exponent bit, flip patterns affect ∆rel greatly. A
”1” to ”0” flip reduces the absolute value of the parameter
closer to 0, resulting in a ∆rel between 0.5 and 1.0 while a
”0” to ”1” flip multiplies the parameter by a power of two.
∆rel for such a change is larger than 1 and up to 2128, which
can be detrimental to the system. For Fraction bit, SIPP only
induces a relatively smaller change with ∆rel between 0 and
0.5.
Thus, this explains the first observation in the last section
why we observe much higher SSIPP for Sign and Exponent
bits than Fraction bits.
B. Understanding the Propagation of SIPP
For different SIPP patterns, the impact of SIPP on
Exponent bit and Fraction bit are detrimental or very
limited, respectively, as discussed in the last sub-section. The
impact of SIPP on Sign bit is uncertain, which needs thorough
analysis. Moreover, analyzing the impact of SIPP on Fraction
and Sign bits can also provide some insights for widely used
fixed-point accelerators [18], [19].
Thus, in this section we will focus on analyzing the impact
of SIPP on Sign bit. Since SIPP on a Sign bit in former
layers of DNNs actually needs to go through multiple layers
to reach output, it is crucial to understand how the perturbation
is propagated and why it is not cancelled out during the
procedure. In the following we will provide detailed analysis
to understand the propagation procedure of SIPP for both FC
and convolution layers.
For the lth FC layer with N inputs and M outputs, N ×M
weights and M biases are needed. The output of this FC layer
is:
Olj =
N∑
i=1
Ii × ωlij + blj , j = 1, 2, ...,M (5)
where ωlij and blj are the corresponding weight and bias.
Fig. 3. An example of perturbation propagation for FC layer: perturbation
on w122 at the 1st layer (left) and perturbation on w222 at the second layer
(right).
For simplicity we will use a portion of FC layers as shown
in Fig. 3 to demonstrate how the perturbation is propagated.
The example contains 3 FC layers with 2 inputs and 2 outputs.
The blue represents SIPP free data and connection, while the
red represents SIPP affected data and connection. If ignoring
nonlinear activation between FC layers for the moment, we
can write down the output as the following:
O3j =ω31j [ω211(ω111I1 + ω121I2) + ω221(ω112I1 + ω122I2)]
+ω32j [ω212(ω111I1 + ω121I2) + ω222(ω112I1 + ω122I2)]
(6)
where j = 1, 2. Then for perturbation on the first and second
layers, for example, ω122 and ω222, the changes at the outputs
from the original values (∆3j = O
′
3j −O3j) are:
∆3j = 2 · (ω31jω221 + ω32jω222)ω122I2, for ω122 (7)
∆3j = 2 · ω32jω222(ω112I1 + ω122I2), for ω222 (8)
From a layer-wise perspective when evaluating SIPP for
all the parameters in a particular layer, we may reasonably
assume the weights from the same layer are similar (but can be
significantly different from layer to layer). For I1 and I2 from
the same input source or distribution, so as those weights in
the same layers. We then may claim that the two perturbations
impose very similar impacts on the output, i.e. ∆SIPP is
statistically insignificant. In other words, SIPP on sign bit from
different layers may eventually result in very similar impact
on the final output of the network if the network only contains
linear operations as in Eq. (6)-(8).
Similar analysis can be conducted on the convolution layer
to find the impact of SIPP on the sign bit of weight and bias
using the following formulations:
OF
′
lq = OFlq − 2× ωlpqrs × IFlp ⊗ Slrs (9)
OF
′
lq = OFlq − 2× blq (10)
where l is the layer index, p and q are the input and output
feature map indexes, r and s specify the weight location for
the convolution kernel, ωlpqrs is the perturbed weight. OF
′
lq
is the perturbed 2D output feature map, while IFlp and OFlq
are the original input and output, respectively. In Eq. (9), Slrs
is a convolution kernel with the same size as the convolution
kernel, with 1 at the perturbed weight’s position and 0 for the
others.
Fig. 4. An example of perturbation propagation for convolution layer.
Unlike FC layer where the perturbation only impacts the
connected data, the perturbation in convolution layer gets am-
plified and effectively propagates to a broader region through
convolution of feature maps, as shown in Fig. 4. The affected
region grows from a kernel to one feature map and then
multiple feature maps. For perturbations on weights in two
different layers, for example, ω11111 and ω21111, the output
differences ∆3122 of (2,2) in the output feature map OF31 for
the two perturbations are:
∆3122(1) = 2
∑
q,r,s,i,j
ω31qrsω21qijω11111I11(r+i−3)(s+j−3) (11)
∆3122(2) = 2
∑
p,r,s,i,j
ω3p1rsω21111ω1p1ijI1p(r+i−2)(s+j−2) (12)
where i and j are the indexes to compute the 2D convolution,∑
q,r,s,i,j denotes the summation over each variable. From
Eq. (12), we may draw a similar conclusion as the FC layers
that, without activation layers, the effect of SIPP on weights
from different convolution layers are almost equivalent for the
output.
The analysis above shows that the key contributors of
the layer-wise difference of SSIPPs are the activation layers.
Thus, the analysis of activation layers is needed. The models
analyzed in this work use ReLU layers for activation. The
calculation of ReLU layers is: Out = max(0, Input), which
means Inputs greater than 0 could propagate through while
the smaller ones would be deactivated. As shown in Fig. 3 and
Fig. 4, the effects of SIPP on the former layers spreads wider
than latter ones, they are less likely to be totally deactivated
by activation layers, and thus more likely to propagate to the
output and affect the classification results.
The analysis above provides systematical support for obser-
vation 2 in the last section.
C. Design Explorations
TABLE II
NUMBER OF PARAMETERS (WEIGHT AND BIAS) FOR DIFFERENT LAYERS
IN THE THREE DNNS: NIN, RESNET56 AND VGG16.
NIN ResNet56 VGG16
Layer #Weight #Bias #Weight #Bias #Weight #Bias
1 14k 192 0.4k 16 1.7k 64
2 30k 160 1.5k 16 37k 64
3 15k 96 3k 32 74k 128
4 460k 192 6.1k 64 295k 128
5 36k 192 - - 590k 256
Last 1.9k 10 6.4k 100 4096k 1000
In this subsection we validate the impact of SIPP and our
findings on different DNN architectures for image classifi-
cation, the performance of which is measured by accuracy.
Three representative architectures are employed in our design
explorations, including a Network in Network (NIN) model
(trained on CIFAR-10) [13], a 56-layer Deep Residual Net-
work (ResNet56) (trained on CIFAR-100) [15], and VGG16
(trained on ImageNet) [14], [20]. The three network architec-
tures are selected to represent different types of feed forward
deep neural networks. NIN is a model with no FC layer and
hence helps us understand the role of convolution layers when
evaluating network robustness. ResNet56 belongs to ResNets,
a group of very deep neural network that consists of tens to
hundreds of convolution layers. Unlike ResNet56 with residual
blocks, VGG net is a more classical deep convolutional neural
network with simpler architecture and widely adopted by a
variety of perception works [21], [22] and analyzed by a
variety of accelerators [19], [23]. The numbers of parameters
for the three neural networks are summarized in Table II. Due
to the size of DNN, we only present the results of the first
five layers and the last layer of each DNN.
Table III demonstrates the impact of SIPP on the different
types of bits, i.e., Sign (denoted by Sign), Exponent (de-
noted by Ex) and Fraction (denoted by Fr), of both weights
(denoted by W) and biases (denoted by B). For each network,
we calculate its SSIPP for a particular layer for the first five
layers (denoted by layer 1 to 5) plus the last layer (denoted
by Last). It is found that the impact of exponent bit is very
prominent while fraction bit has very limited SSIPP. Moreover,
sign bits of the first few layers have larger impacts than the
rest layers, which is consistent with our analysis in the last
subsection. The SSIPP on Exponent bits in each layer is
similar because they could always destroy the whole network
into a random guesser.
We further investigate the propagation of SIPP on the same
network architecture but with different complexity. Fig. 5
compares SSIPP of first layer on Sign bit for 4 residual
networks with different depth, i.e., ResNets with 20, 56, 110
and 164 layers. As shown in the Figure, with deeper network,
the impact of SIPP is more prominent, which is also consistent
with the findings in the last subsection.
Thus, based on the observation, analysis and experimental
results, we may summarize the following findings:
• Finding 1: For the three types of bits in a 32-bit FP
parameter, SIPP on Exponent bit has the largest impact
on network output while the impact from Fraction bit is
the minimal, with the impact of Sign bit in the middle.
• Finding 2: SIPP on Sign bit has layer-wise impact within
the same network. The layer farther from the output
is typically more sensitive and brings more significant
change to the output.
• Finding 3: For two networks, with width of the network
being the same, the deeper the network, the more sensitive
the network is to SIPP.
Fig. 5. SSIPP of ResNets with different depth for perturbation on Sign bit
of the first layer.
V. REMEDIES
With the findings in the last section, the weakness of a
network is more observable. Thus, it is necessary to further
investigate the possible remedy solutions to the weakness.
This section discusses two simple yet efficient remedies to the
issues caused by SIPP and then investigates design trade-offs
for the two methods.
A. Triple Modular Redundancy for Parameter Protection
For the parameters susceptible to SIPP, a natural solution is
to provide multiple copies for the parameters of interest. Triple
Modular Redundancy (TMR) [24] is just such a method that
copies twice the circuit to be protected, thereby forming a
group of three identical circuits with three outputs. The three
outputs then go through a majority-voter to mask the fault
and decide a single output. With the findings presented in
previous sections, we can prepare three identical copies of the
parameters in SRAM to fully prevent SIPP. When parameters
are fetched and sent to neural networks, the three copies of one
parameter will go through a simple TMR circuit to chooses
the correct output.
TABLE III
SSIPP OF DIFFERENT LAYERS FOR THE THREE NEURAL NETWORKS WITH SIPP ON THE Sign (SIGN), Exponent (EX) AND Fraction (FR) BITS OF
WEIGHTS (W) AND BIASES (B).
NIN/Sign NIN/Ex NIN/Fr Res56/Sign Res56/Ex Res56/Fr VGG16/Sign VGG16/Ex VGG16/Fr
Layer W B W B W B W B W B W B W B W B W B
1 1.0% 2.2% 80% 80% 0.2% 0.4% 28.1% 16.9% 70% 70% 0.4% 0.4% 4.2% 2.4% 70% 70% 0.9% 0.9%
2 0.2% 4.4% 80% 80% 0.1% 0.2% 6.4% 1.2% 70% 70% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.4% 70% 70% 0.1% 0.2%
3 0.3% 2.4% 80% 80% 0.2% 0.1% 2.1% 1.2% 70% 70% 0.4% 0.5% 0.1% 0.1% 70% 70% 0.1% 0.1%
4 0.1% 0.1% 80% 80% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 1.1% 70% 70% 0.3% 0.4% 0.1% 0.1% 70% 70% 0.1% 0.1%
5 0.3% 0.2% 80% 80% 0.2% 0.1% - - - - - - 0.1% 0.1% 70% 70% 0.1% 0.1%
Last 2.4% 0.2% 80% 80% 0.7% 0.1% 1.0% 0.1% 70% 70% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 70% 70% 0.1% 0.1%
B. Error-Correcting Code
Apparently, the area overhead of TMR based parameter
protection can be significant. To resolve this issue, we further
adopt error-correcting code (ECC) to protect parameters in
SRAM with much smaller area overhead.
Hamming code is a family of binary linear ECCs by offering
redundant correcting bits. With its single-bit protection feature,
we can rely on Hamming code based ECC to fully protect the
issues caused by SIPP. The number of redundant bits (r) to
protect d data bits needs to satisfy the following constraint:
r + d ≤ 2r − 1 (13)
Thus, the area overhead of ECC is exponentially smaller than
TMR based approach. However, the SRAM area saving of
ECC is at the cost of more complex logic to implement the
protection and correction circuit. Fig. 6 presents the SRAM
area and protection logic overhead for ECC w.r.t. TMR-
based protection. It is found that, to protect 100 bits, with the
SRAM and logic area overhead of the TMR-based method,
only 3.5% of the area overhead could be achieved at a cost of
approximately 3.5× of protection logic.
Fig. 6. Relative SRAM (a) and logic (b) area overhead for ECC w.r.t. TMR
based protection.
C. Design Trade-Off
With the explorations in the last section, we are aware of
the sensitivity of layers and bits for a DNN. Thus, instead of
fully protecting all the parameters, we can further reduce both
SRAM and protection logic area overhead by tolerating SIPP
in non-sensitive bits. Fig. 7 demonstrates the area overhead for
SRAM and protection logics, respectively, when implementing
the TMR based protection. The area overhead is normalized to
the case of full protection, i.e., all the parameters are protected.
The SSIPP on the y-axis is normalized to the case without
any protection, i.e., the wrost case SSIPP. The figure then
provides design trade-off opportunities for the three DNNs.
It can be seen that with merely 24% SRAM and protection
logic overhead, we can reduce the SSIPP for ResNet56 to
only 2.08%. Similar design trade-off can be conducted for
ECC based protection, as shown in Fig. 8(a) and (b). With
23% SRAM area overhead and 25% protection logic overhead,
ECC based protection can reduce the SSIPP for ResNet56 to
2.08%. By further increasing SRAM overhead to 25%, SSIPP
can be further reduced to 0.27%.
Fig. 7. Normalized area overhead (normalized to full protection) using TMR
based protection for three DNNs: (a) SRAM area overhead and (b) Protection
logic area overhead for SSIPP (normalized to the case without protection).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigate the robustness of DNNs from
a hardware prospective about the impact of SIPP. We system-
atically define the fault models of SEU and then provide the
definition of SSIPP as the robustness measure for the network.
We then analytically explore the weakness of a network and
summarize the key findings for impacts of SIPP on different
types of bits in an FP parameter, layer-wise robustness within
the same network and impact of network depth. Based on
these findings, two remedy solutions can be adopted to protect
DNNs from SIPP.
Fig. 8. Normalized area overhead (normalized to full protection) using ECC
based protection for three DNNs: (a) SRAM area overhead and (b) Protection
logic area overhead for SSIPP (normalized to the case without protection).
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